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IV 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
ROGER ALLEN MALCOLM, : Case No. 20080781 -CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Defendant/Appellant Roger Malcolm maintains the trial court erred when it failed 
to instruct the jury on important concepts going to his theory of the case and his 
manslaughter defenses. (Br. of Appellant). In connection with Malcolm's request for 
instructions on extreme-emotional-distress manslaughter and imperfect-legal-justification 
manslaughter, he requested instructions on a person's use of force in making a citizen's 
arrest and use of force in expelling someone from property. Those instructions were 
factually interconnected to the manslaughter alternatives at issue in this case. 
Specifically, the facts show that a security guard, Verne Jenkins, used force to 
make a citizen's arrest against Malcolm and/or to expel him from the convenience store 
at Sapp Brothers Truck Stop. The evidence created a question of fact for the jury as to 
whether Verne had the right to use force under the circumstances or whether his use of 
force was illegal and unjustified and served to provoke Malcolm into a physical 
confrontation. The jury should have been allowed to consider those issues in the correct 
context and under the unique circumstances of this case. Where the evidence shows that 
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Verne did not have the right to use force (even in his own store), the jury also could find 
that his unjustified use of force would cause a reasonable person in Malcolm's position to 
suffer overwhelming distress, and/or it would cause a reasonable person to believe he was 
entitled to defend himself, although he may not be entitled to use deadly force. The 
evidence in context would support manslaughter. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
203(4) (2008). Since the trial court refused to instruct the jury on the relevant issues, it 
prevented the jury from considering whether Verne's actions in making an arrest or 
expelling Malcolm from property were unlawful and unjustified, and whether the actions 
provoked Malcolm for application of the manslaughter defenses. The trial court's ruling 
resulted in prejudicial error. (Br. of Appellant, Arg.) 
The State disagrees. First, it claims the instructions as a whole adequately advised 
the jury of the law. (See Br. of Appellee, Arg. LB.) In support of that claim, the State 
cites to the elements instructions for the greater and lesser offenses, an instruction that 
dealt generally with use of force, and an instruction advising that a security guard is an 
ordinary person. Malcolm does not take issue with those instructions. However, they do 
not address the relevant concepts at issue here and based in the law: specifically, that 
even an ordinary person does not have unbridled authority to use force in making a 
citizen's arrest or in expelling someone from his own property. Since Verne Jenkins used 
force to make a citizen's arrest or to expel Malcolm from the store, the jury should have 
been allowed to consider whether such force was unjustified, and whether it triggered 
application of the manslaughter alternatives. 
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Second, the State claims Malcolm's evidence failed to support the requested 
instructions. According to the State, Malcolm's testimony about an accidental shooting 
was inconsistent with the manslaughter defenses. (7#., Arg. I.C.) The State's argument is 
irrelevant and misplaced since the specific instructions for manslaughter are not at issue 
here. Moreover, Malcolm's requested instructions for use of force to expel and to arrest 
would have been particularly relevant to the jury in considering whether Verne Jenkins 
used unwarranted force to make an arrest or to remove Malcolm from the premises. The 
requested instructions in context would require the jury to consider Verne's actions. That 
issue is separate from the issue of whether the shooting was an accident. 
Third, the State seems to claim that the trial court's failure to provide the re-
quested instructions resulted in harmless error because Malcolm was able to present his 
theory of the case to the jury through evidence and closing argument, and the evidence 
failed to support the manslaughter alternatives. (Br. of Appellee, Arg. I.D.) Again, the 
State's arguments are misplaced. Under the law, where the evidence and the defendant's 
theory support the instructions, the trial court is required to give them. Failure to do so 
results in prejudice since the jury has not been adequately informed of its responsibilities 
under the law. In addition, based on the record here, the trial court approved instructions 
for the manslaughter alternatives. Consequently, that is not an issue before this Court. 
For the reasons set forth below, and as more fully set forth in the Brief of 
Appellant, Malcolm respectfully requests that this Court reverse the conviction and 
remand the case for a new trial where he may be given the opportunity to present 
instructions to the jury relating to his theory of the case and the manslaughter defenses. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE STATE SEEMS TO CLAIM MALCOLM WAS NOT ENTITLED TO 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON HIS DEFENSE WHERE HE WAS 
OTHERWISE ABLE TO PRESENT HIS DEFENSE THROUGH 
EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT. YET UNDER THE LAW, THE TRIAL 
COURT HAS A DUTY TO INSTRUCT THE JURY IN THAT INSTANCE. 
Malcolm maintains the conviction here should be reversed for a new trial where he 
may be allowed to present his requested instructions for use of force in making a citizen's 
arrest and use of force in expelling someone from property. (See R. 139; 140 (requested 
instructions); 207:389-93, 395-97 (arguing for the proposed jury instructions); 207:438-
39 (reflecting evidence supporting the instructions)). 
Under Utah law, and as a matter of fundamental fairness, a defendant has the right 
to have his "theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear and understandable way" 
with relevant jury instructions. State v. Potter\ 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981); see also 
State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (stating the defendant has a 
right to have his "theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear and comprehensible 
manner"); State v. Aly, 782 P.2d 549, 550 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stating "[a] criminal 
defendant is entitled to have the gist of his defense reflected in the instructions given to 
the jury, and the instructions should not incorrectly or misleadingly state the material 
rules of law"); Jorzensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d 80, 82 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (stating "[a] party 
is clearly entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory of the case"); Utah Const, art. 
I, § 7 (ensuring due process); U.S. Const, amend XIV, § 1 (same). 
Moreover, a trial court "has a duty to instruct the jury on the relevant law." State 
v. Low, 2008 UT 58, \ 27, 192 P.3d 867; see also State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 
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(Utah 1992) (stating the trial court has the duty to instruct on the law applicable to the 
case); State v. Castillo, 457 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah 1969) (stating a defendant is entitled to 
have the jury instructed "fully and clearly" on the law of his defense). "The purpose of 
the instructions is to set forth the issues and the law applicable thereto in a clear, concise 
and orderly manner, so that the jury will understand how to discharge its 
responsibilities." State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 696 (Utah 1980). 
In this case, the State claims Malcolm was not entitled to have the jury instructed 
on use of force to make an arrest, or use of force to expel a person from property because 
the jury charge as a whole adequately advised the jury on the law; because Malcolm 
testified that the shooting was an accident; and because Malcolm was not prejudiced by 
the lack of jury instructions where he was able to present evidence and closing arguments 
for his defense. (See Br. of Appellee, Arg.) The State's arguments are unavailing. 
A. CONTRARY TO THE STATE'S CLAIMS, THE JURY CHARGE AS A 
WHOLE WAS INSUFFICIENT. 
The State claims the instruction charge as a whole adequately advised the jury of 
all pertinent issues relating to Malcolm's defense. (See Br. of Appellee, Arg. I.B.2.) In 
support of that claim, the State cites to the jury instruction for the "elements of murder" 
(id. at 25); the instructions describing extreme-emotional-distress manslaughter (uL at 25-
26); the instructions for imperfect-legal-justification manslaughter (icL at 26-27); an 
instruction discussing when force is or is not justified in general, including that a person 
is not justified in using force if he "'initially provoke[d] the use of force'" or if he "cwas 
the aggressor'" (uL at 26-27); the instructions for self defense (UL at 27-28); and an 
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instruction advising the jury that a "'security guard who is not a certified peace officer 
has only the same rights and privileges afforded to any ordinary person."' (IcL at 28; see 
also Br. of Appellant, Arg. C. (discussing the jury charge as a whole and as inadequate)). 
The State claims those instructions were adequate: "if the jury accepted Malcolm's claim 
that he was voluntarily leaving the store when Jenkins unjustifiably attacked him, the 
court's instructions clearly allowed the jury to fully consider whether that unjustifiable 
attack provoked an 'extreme emotional distress' for which 'there was a reasonable 
explanation or excuse.'" (Br. of Appellee, 28). 
Yet the instructions were deficient. They failed to advise the jury that contrary to 
any notion about common law rights - see, e.g., Gregory Y. Titelman, Random House 
Dictionary of Popular Proverbs and Savings, 223 (Random House 1996) (stating the 
phrase "et domus sua cuique tutissimum refugium (onefs home is the safest refuge for 
all)" means "[y]ou are the boss in your own house and nobody can tell you what to do 
there"); see also William and Mary Morris, Morris Dictionary of Word and Phrase 
Origins, 368 (Harper Collins 1977) (stating the phrase, "[a] man's home is his castle" is 
"as old as the basic concepts of English common law") - a man may not do as he pleases 
in his own home or shop, and the same goes for a security guard charged with protecting 
the shop. Indeed, Utah statutory law specifies the extent to which a person, a shopkeeper, 
or an ordinary person responsible for protecting property may use force to make an arrest 
or to expel someone from the premises. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-403, 76-2-406 (2008); 
(see Br. of Appellant, Arg. A. (stating a person may use force under certain 
circumstances to expel another from property; likewise, a person may use force under 
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certain circumstances to make an arrest)); State v. Quada, 918 P.2d 883 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996) (ruling defendant's convictions for aggravated assault would stand where the 
defendant used unlawful force against persons on his own property). 
In this case, the trial court explained that the jury must consider whether Malcolm 
acted intentionally or knowingly (R. 171 (instructions for murder); 173; 177 (instructions 
for manslaughter alternatives)); whether Malcolm acted under the influence of extreme 
emotional distress that was not substantially caused by his own conduct (R. 172-76 
(instruction for extreme-emotional-distress manslaughter)); whether Malcolm reasonably 
believed the circumstances allowed him to defend himself although he was not justified 
in using deadly force (R. 177-79 (instructions for imperfect-legal-justification 
manslaughter); see also R. 187 (setting forth factors in determining imminence or 
reasonableness including the nature of the danger, the level of the unlawful force, prior 
acts or propensities, and the history of the parties)); whether Malcolm acted negligently 
(R. 181); and whether Malcolm acted in perfect self defense (R. 185-94). 
Also, the court explained that a person may use force when he reasonably believes 
it is necessary to defend himself against the unlawful use of force by another; and he may 
use deadly force (for perfect self defense) if it is necessary to prevent death or serious 
bodily injury. (R. 185). Likewise, the court advised the jury that a person may not use 
force if he "initially provoke[d] the use of force against himself with the intent to use 
force as an excuse to inflict" harm; if he attempted to commit, committed, or was fleeing 
from the commission of a crime; or if he were the aggressor. (R. 186). Those 
instructions were relevant, yet they failed to explain when a person may use force to 
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make a citizen's arrest or to remove a person from his own property. (See R. 155-99). 
They failed to explain that while Verne had a duty to protect the store, he was not at 
liberty under the law to initiate an aggressive and physical encounter in order to arrest or 
to remove Malcolm from the store. (See R. 155-99 (Jury instructions); see also Br. of 
Appellant, Arg. C.) And where Verne engaged in such conduct, the jury should have 
been allowed to consider whether Verne's conduct was unlawful even in his own store. 
(Br. of Appellant, Args. A. and B.) 
Since the trial court rejected the requested instructions, the jury was not allowed to 
consider whether Verne's conduct in tackling Malcolm to the ground for a citizen's arrest 
or to expel him from the store was excessive and unlawful, thereby provoking Malcolm 
for application of the manslaughter alternatives. (See Br. of Appellant, Arg. C.) Without 
instructions on those relevant concepts, the jury likely believed that a man's home or his 
shop is his castle: that Verne Jenkins - an ordinary man serving as a store security guard 
- was justified in protecting the store with use of force, even though Malcolm was 
already in the process of leaving the store. (See Br. of Appellant, Arg. C.) In that regard, 
the jury charge as a whole was incomplete amd misleading. 
Next, the State suggests that Malcolm's requested instructions may have worked 
to "cut against" his manslaughter defense. (Br. of Appellee, 29). According to the State, 
if the jury believed Verne was trying to make "what he thought was" a legitimate arrest, 
it also may believe Malcolm's response was unreasonable. (Id.) The State's claim is 
speculative and irrelevant. It is speculative because under the circumstances, if the trial 
court had instructed the jury as Malcolm requested, it is likely that the jury would have 
8 
considered the facts in context to find that Verne Jenkins initiated an aggressive physical 
attack that provoked Malcolm. (See, e.g.* Br. of Appellant, Arg. D.) The State's claim is 
irrelevant because under the law, Malcolm was "entitled to have the jury instructed on his 
theory of the case." Jorzensen* 739 P.2d at 82; Utah Const, art. I, § 7 (ensuring due 
process); U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 (same). Proper instructions would have ensured 
fairness. This Court may reject the State's speculative possibilities and claims on appeal. 
B. THE STATE CLAIMS MALCOLM'S TESTIMONY ABOUT AN 
ACCIDENTAL SHOOTING WAS INCONSISTENT WITH HIS REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT IS MISPLACED. 
The State claims that Malcolm's testimony was inconsistent with the requested 
instructions because Malcolm "was adamant that he did not intend to shoot Jenkins at 
all." (Br. of Appellee, 30). The State's argument is misplaced since the jury was 
required to deliberate several issues in the case. First, it was required to consider whether 
Verne Jenkins was justified in using physical force against Malcolm. (R. 207:395-96, 
397 (stating the jury would have to resolve issues surrounding Verne Jenkins's conduct)). 
In that regard, it was required to consider whether Verne's use of force was unlawful and 
provoked Malcolm. (See, e.z.. R. 207:393, 395-97); State v. Ross, 501 P.2d 632, 635 
(Utah 1972) (stating provocation is an element for the jury). Malcolm's requested jury 
instructions on the use of force to make an arrest or to expel a person from property 
related to that issue, and would have allowed the jury to consider whether Verne was 
unjustified in using force in his own shop. (See R. 139-40 (requested instructions); 
207:389-98 (discussing instructions)). Consequently, the trial court should have given 
the requested instructions to the jury. 
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Second, the jury was required to consider whether Malcolm responded to Verne's 
conduct by intentionally or accidentally shooting him. (R. 171 (instructing jury on 
several elements, including intentional and knowing conduct); 173 (same); 177 (same); 
181 (instructing the jury on several elements, including negligence)); see also State v. 
Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ^[ 16, 23, 152 P.3d 315 (recognizing that the manslaughter 
alternatives apply if defendant acted intentionally in response to an attack by another); 
State v. Shumwav, 2002 UT 124, Iffl 11-13, 14, 63 P.3d 94 (same); State v. Padilla* 776 
P.2d 1329, 1330 (Utah 1989) (recognizing that extreme-emotional-distress manslaughter 
incorporates the heat-of-passion standard). Where the State claims on appeal that 
Malcolm "was adamant that he did not intend to shoot Jenkins" (Br. of Appellee, 30), 
those facts would have been pertinent to the jury in considering Malcolm's state of mind; 
and that is an issue separate and distinct from Verne's unjustified use of force. 
Third, the jury was required to consider whether Malcolm's intentional or 
accidental conduct was justified for purposes of a perfect self defense, or was unjustified 
for a criminal conviction. (See, e.g., R. 193-94 (defining perfect self defense); 177-IS 
(defining imperfect legal justification)). If the jury had been allowed to consider the facts 
in the context of the requested instructions, it likely would have found that Verne Jenkins, 
an ordinary person acting as security guard, was not justified in using force against 
another even where Verne was responsible for protecting the property. The jury then 
would consider whether Malcolm's response was lawful for perfect self defense; or 
unlawful and intentional or accidental for a criminal conviction. 
In sum, Malcolm's testimony about the accidental nature of the shooting in no way 
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conflicted with his requested instructions for use of force to make an arrest or to expel a 
person from property. See Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ]f 19 (recognizing that a defendant is 
entitled to requested instructions even where there are "ambiguities or inconsistencies" in 
the evidence) (emphasis added). This Court may reject the State's arguments on appeal. 
C. UNDER THE PREJUDICE STANDARD. THE TRIAL COURT IS RE-
QUIRED TO GIVE THE REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS IF THE EVIDENCE 
AND THE DEFENDANT'S THEORY SUPPORT THE INSTRUCTIONS. 
(1) The State fs Argument Misunderstands the Prejudice Analysis, 
The State claims the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on Malcolm's theory of 
the case "was harmless [error] because Malcolm fully argued his manslaughter theories to 
the jury" through evidence and in closing argument. (Br. of Appellee, 31). That claim 
should be rejected for three reasons. First, it disregards the law. According to the Utah 
Supreme Court, if the defendant's evidence and closing arguments support the requested 
instructions, the trial court is not relieved under the prejudice prong from instructing the 
jury on the issues - as the State claims (Br. of Appellee, 31). Rather, the trial court has a 
"duty" in that instance to instruct the jury on the issues. See_ Potter, 627 P.2d at 78. 
"Encompassed in this duty is the right of the defendant to have his theory of the case 
presented to the jury in a clear and understandable way." Id, (footnote omitted); see also 
Low, 2008 UT 58, f 25 (stating "the court is obligated to give the instruction if evidence 
has been presented - either by the prosecution or by the defendant - that provides any 
reasonable basis upon which a jury could conclude that the affirmative defense applies to 
the defendant") (emphasis added; citation omitted); State v. Valdez, 604 P.2d 472, 473 
(Utah 1979) (stating "[i]t is defendant's right to have the jury instructed on his theory of 
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the case so long as the requested instruction is warranted by the evidence presented at 
trial").1 Also, "[t]o facilitate clarity," the trial court should relate the instructions "to the 
specific facts of the case. By doing this the court can effectively guard against the jury 
being misled or confusing" the concepts. Potter, 627 P.2d at 79-78. 
Second, under the law, the trial court's failure to give the requested instructions 
results in presumptive prejudice: "'failing to instruct on the lesser included offense 
presumptively affects the outcome of the trial. . . [and] our confidence in the verdict is 
undermined.'" Spillers, 2007 UT 13, f 24 (emphasis added; quoting State v. Knight, 
2003 UT App 354, ^ 17, 79 P.3d 969); see also Potter, 627 P.2d at 78 (stating defendant 
was denied a fair trial "on the critical issues of the case" where the instructions were "so 
general" they "could have misled and confused the jury"). In this case, where the 
evidence was in dispute and it supported the requested instructions, the circumstances 
supported prejudice. See Spillers, 2007 UT 13, f 24; (Br. of Appellant, Arg. D.) 
1
 In assessing whether the trial court should have given Malcolm's requested 
instructions, this Court will view the facts and the reasonable inferences "cin the light 
most favorable to the defense.'" Spillers, 2007 UT 13, % 10 (citation omitted). Also, this 
Court will decide "whether there is a sufficient quantum of evidence presented to justify 
sending the question to the jury, a decision which must be made concerning all jury 
instructions in any trial." State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983). 
To be clear, Malcolm was not obligated in this case to present the evidence for the 
requested instructions or to prove their relevance to the jury for the manslaughter alter-
natives. Se£ Spillers, 2007 UT 13, f^ 19. "A defendant is not required to testify at all, nor 
is he required to present any evidence at trial; he cmay simply point to ambiguities or 
inconsistencies in the evidence presented by the State and require the State to prove every 
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.'" IdL (citation omitted). "[A] 
defendant in a criminal case bears no burden of persuasion." I(L (citation omitted). 
"
cThe ultimate burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
remains on the state, whether defendant offers any evidence in an effort to prove 
affirmative defenses or not.'" I(L (citation omitted). 
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And third, contrary to the State's assertion, defense counsel's closing argument 
was not a sufficient substitute for the requested instructions. Specifically, the trial court 
instructed the jury that it must take the law set forth "in the instructions" and apply that 
law "to the facts" of the case. (R. 155). Also, the court specified that "[a]ll the 
instructions are important" (id.), while the lawyers are simply "advocating their views of 
the case. What they may have said at any time during these proceedings and what they 
say during their closing arguments is not evidence. . . . If they say anything about the law 
that conflicts with these instructions, you are to rely on these instructions." (R. 157). In 
that regard, where the instructions as a whole failed to contain relevant concepts (see Br. 
of Appellant, Arg. C; see also supra, Arg. A.), the jury has not properly advised. 
In short, the evidence and defense counsel's closing arguments supported 
Malcolm's requested instructions in this case. (See Br. of Appellee, Args. I.A.2. and 
I.A.3. (acknowledging that the evidence and defense counsel's arguments supported the 
instructions)). Those circumstances militate in favor of giving the instructions. (See Br. 
of Appellant, Arg. D.) In this case, Malcolm's requested instructions would have given 
the jury context and guidance. (See, e.g., R. 155 (instructing the jury that it must decide 
the facts from the evidence and it must "take the law I give you in the instructions" and 
"apply it to the facts")). They were pertinent to his defense. See Spillers, 2007 UT 13, f 
19 (stating as long as evidence supports defendant's theory, he "is entitled to the jury 
instruction if he requests it"). The trial court erred in failing to give the requested 
instructions. See Ontiveros, 835 P.2d at 205 (stating the court has a duty to instruct the 
jury on the law applicable to the facts). 
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(2) The State's Prejudice Analysis Misapprehends the Law for Extreme-
Emotional-Distress Manslaughter and Imperfect-Legal-Justification 
Manslaughter. 
Next, the State claims the error was harmless because the evidence 
"overwhelmingly negated any finding that Malcolm acted under an extreme emotional 
disturbance or that he reasonably believed that he was legally justified." (Br. of 
Appellee, 31). The State's claims are misplaced for several reasons. First, in support of 
its claim, the State attempts to marshal the evidence for the conviction. (See Br. of 
Appellee, 31-33). Yet the standard for marshaling evidence in favor of the conviction has 
no place here. The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that in considering whether the 
defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on his defense, it will view the evidence 
and inferences "'in the light most favorable to the defense.'" Spillers^ 2007 UT 13, \ 10 
(emphasis added); (see also supra note 1, herein). 
Second, the State's claims seem to attack the specific instructions for extreme-
emotional-distress manslaughter and imperfect-legal-justification manslaughter. (Br. of 
Appellee, 32-33 (stating Malcolm did not suffer distress, and the evidence failed to 
support imperfect legal justification)). Yet the trial court considered the evidence to be 
sufficient to support those particular instructions, and they are not at issue here. (See R. 
172-80). Rather, the issue is whether the evidence supports instructions for use of force 
to make a citizen's arrest or to expel someone from property. (See Br. of Appellant, Arg.; 
see also R. 139; 140 (requested instructions)). In this case, the trial court acknowledged 
the jury would have to resolve issues relating to force and provocation. (See R. 207:395-
97). Yet the court refused to give Malcolm's instructions relating to those issues. (See R. 
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207:397). That was error. State v. Johnson, 185 P.2d 738, 744 (Utah 1947) (citing cases 
from other states to support that when the evidence raises questions going to justification 
or provocation, the jury should be instructed on the matter); State v. Law, 147 P.2d 324, 
327 (Utah 1944) (whether defendant had a reasonable basis to believe his adversary 
would take his life or do him great harm was a jury question); State v. Turner, 79 P.2d 46, 
52, 54 (Utah 1938) (whether defendant's adversary provoked him was a jury question). 
Third, where extreme-emotional-distress manslaughter and imperfect-legal-
justification manslaughter are relevant to the analysis, the State's arguments concerning 
those forms of manslaughter misapprehend the law. Indeed, the State claims that 
evidence of Verne grabbing "Malcolm on the shoulder or about the neck" does not 
support a "'provocative act'" and extreme emotional distress manslaughter. (Br. of 
Appellee, 32). Yet the evidence supports manslaughter. The evidence shows that before 
the shooting, Malcolm was agitated and flustered at being ignored in the convenience-
store area of the truck stop. (SeeR. 206:118, 138; seeaho> 206:78-79, 95, 101, 139, 146 
(stating Malcolm asked, "Why can't I get any service around here?"); 206:155 (stating 
Malcolm was loud and belligerent); 206:171). Verne Jenkins responded by telling 
Malcolm to leave. (R. 206:79, 103; see also 206: 97-98 (stating Malcolm may have said, 
"All this is just for a piece of gum. All I want is gum." And Verne said, "No, you are 
being rude. You need to leave."); 206:141-42 (stating Verne asked Malcolm to calm 
down or leave and he used an authoritative tone)). 
As Malcolm was collecting his bicycle from the Burger King area to leave (R. 
207:457-58), Verne used force and initiated a physical altercation against him. (R. 
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206:79-80, 93, 146-47; 207:458-61, 483-84). Veme had Malcolm in a headlock and tried 
to take him to the ground. (R. 206:124-25, 127 (statmg Veme tried to take Malcolm 
down); 206:131-32 (stating Veme placed Malcolm in a headlock to detain him and to get 
him to leave); 206:142-43 (stating Malcolm went over to his bike and Veme grabbed him 
by the shoulder and the men "got in a scuffle"); 206:147, 157-58 (stating the struggle 
started when "Vern[e] was trying to get his hands on [Malcolm]" to get him out of the 
store; and describing Veme as having his arm in front of Malcolm's chest)). 
Veme used physical force to detain Malcolm or to make a citizen's arrest as 
Malcolm was trying to leave; also Veme used physical force to expel Malcolm from the 
premises. (See R. 208:546-48 (prosecutor recounted witness testimony that,Veme tried 
to "detain" or "restrain" Malcolm; and Veme used force in an effort to get Malcolm "to 
leave the store" after Malcolm mumbled something); 208:564-65 (prosecutor claimed 
that the "only mistake Veme made" was in trying to restrain Malcolm)). The evidence 
viewed "'in the light most favorable to the defense,'" Spillers, 2007 UT 13, \ 10 (citation 
omitted), supports the manslaughter alternatives. See id. at ^ j 12, 16-23 
In addition, it supports that the jury should have been instructed as to when a 
person may use force to make a citizen's arrest and/or to expel someone from their own 
property. {See R. 139; 140 (requested instructions)). Malcolm's requested instructions 
would have allowed the jury to consider concepts relevant to extreme-emotional-distress 
manslaughter: whether Verne's force was unlawful and excessive, and therefore 
provoked Malcolm into the attack. See Spillers, 2007 UT 13, Tffl 16, 23; Shumway, 2002 
UT 124, Iflf 11-13, 14; see also Johnson, 185 P.2d at 744 (stating the jury should be 
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instructed when the evidence raises questions going to justification or provocation); 
Tamer, 79 F2d at 52, 54 (stating the issue of pro vocation is for the jury). 
Also, the requested instructions would have allowed the jury to consider concepts 
relevant to imperfect-legal-justification manslaughter: whether Verne's excessive and 
unlawful force would cause a reasonable person to believe he was entitled to defend 
himself, although he may not be entitled to "escalateQ" the altercation with "deadly 
force" where "Jenkins was unarmed." (Br. of Appellee, 33, 32); see also Spillers, 2007 
UT 13, f^ 22 (discussing imperfect-legal-justification manslaughter).2 Those 
circumstances support the manslaughter alternatives as well as the requested instructions 
tor use of force m making an arrest or expeffmg someone from property. 
Finally, the State repeats some of its earlier arguments and claims Malcolm was 
not entitled to the requested instructions because he was "'perfectly calm' and 'relaxed'" 
immediately after the shooting, Verne's aggressive conduct was not sufficient to provoke 
distress, the shooting was an accident, and Malcolm was not justified in escalating the 
altercation or using deadly force. (Br. of Appellee, 32-33). Yet Malcolm's "'perfectly 
2
 The State seems to claim that for imperfect-legal-justification manslaughter, the 
evidence would have to support that Malcolm reasonably believed "he was entitled to use 
deadly force," {See Br. of Appellee, 33; see also id. at 32). Yet the imperfect-le^al-
justification form of manslaughter applies "when the defendant caused another's death 
'under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification or excuse 
for his conduct although the conduct was not legally justifiable or excusable under the 
existing circumstances"' Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ^ 22 (emphasis added; citation omitted). 
Consequently, if the defendant believed he was entitled to defend himself but he was not 
entitled to use deadly force, manslaughter applies. I(L 
On the other hand, if the evidence supports that the defendant reasonably believed 
he was Entitled to use deadly force, those facts "create, a question of fact" for the jury for 
a perfect self defense. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, \ 23. 
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calm' and 'relaxed'" demeanor (id.) after the shooting is irrelevant. (See R. 176 
(instructing the jury that it must consider the issue of distress "under the then existing 
circumstances," i.e., at the time of the shooting); 192 (instructing the jury that it may not 
judge the defendant based on "after-developed events")). Also, Verne's conduct in 
slamming Malcolm to the floor was sufficient to give rise to extreme distress. See 
Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ff 16-20 (stating evidence of a verbal dispute followed by the 
victim's attack is sufficient to support the defendant's distress) (see also R. 172-80 (the 
trial court instructed the jury on the manslaughter alternatives)). In addition, the 
accidental or intentional nature of the shooting is a separate issue. (See supra, Arg. B., 
herein). And evidence that Malcolm believed he could defend himself, but lacked 
justification to use deadly force, supports the imperfect-legal-justification manslaughter 
alternative. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, \ 22 (stating manslaughter applies when the defendant 
was not justified in using deadly force) (see also supra, note 2, herein). 
In sum, the trial court recognized that issues of provocation and unlawful force 
were "'in dispute'" and for the jury to decide. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ^ 24; (R. 207:395-
97). In addition, the State's brief concedes that evidence was consistent with defendant's 
theory of the case. (See Br. of Appellee, 21-22 (stating defendant presented evidence on 
his theory and closing argument); see also Br. of Appellant, Arg. B. (stating evidence 
supported instructions as to when a person can make a citizen's arrest with force, and 
when a person may be justified in using force to expel another from property)). 
Moreover, at trial, the jury found Malcolm guilty of intentional homicide. (See R. 202). 
Those circumstances are consistent with evidence that Verne, an ordinary person acting 
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as a security guard, may not have been justified in using force to make a citizen's arrest 
or to expel someone even from property he protected, and that such force provoked 
Malcolm for application of the manslaughter alternatives. (Br. of Appellant, Arg.) 
While the evidence may be consistent with other theories or defenses, that does 
not undermine the importance of Malcolm's requested instructions here. As the Utah 
Supreme Court has recognized, "'Society has a legitimate interest in the juryfs freedom to 
act according to the evidence.' Where the defendant requests an instruction of a lesser-
included or a related offense and where there is some rational basis in the evidence on 
which the jury could find as the defendant requests, the instruction must be given." State 
v. Hansen. 734 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986) (citation omitted). "A primary purpose of a 
criminal trial is the vindication of the laws of a civilized society against those who are 
guilty of transgressing those laws. The process, however, must be based on procedures 
which are consonant with fairness both to the defendant and the State." State v. HowelL 
649 P.2d 91, 94 (Utah 1982). "It is the duty of the judge to instruct the jury on [the] rele-
vant law." Hansen, 734 P.2d at 428. The law on instructions "is not a mere technical rule 
designed to trip up judges and prosecutors. It serves a fundamental policy of permitting 
the jury to find a defendant guilty of any offense that fits the facts" and the law. Hansen, 
734 P.2d at 424. If the trial court fails in its duty, the jury will never be "given the 
choice," icl_ at 428, of considering the appropriate outcome for the case. Here, the trial 
court rejected Malcolm's requested instructions and effectively prevented the jury from 
considering his theory of the case under the law. That resulted in prejudicial error. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein and in the Brief of Appellant, Malcolm respect-
fully requests that this Court reverse the conviction and remand the case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this V^ day of September, 2009. 
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